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Abstract: Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance 
contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They 
constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively 
create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of international cartels, the handling of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the governance of international antitrust 
cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits. However, 
they also entail several caveats. Three possible working problems and downside ef-
fects of lead jurisdiction models in international competition policy enforcement are 
discussed in this paper.  
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1. Introduction 
In a globalized world, the radius of business activities often extends the geography 
of jurisdictions. As a consequence, pro- and anticompetitive business strategies and 
arrangements with cross-border effects may face competition policy scrutiny of the 
very same case in several jurisdictions and by several authorities. Such multiple pro-
ceedings of one and the same antitrust case entail considerable disadvantages that 
have been extensively discussed in the literature: 
- increasing transaction costs for companies who are forced to submit materials 
to and comply with procedures and outcomes of multiple competition policy 
authorities (ICN 2002), 
# Prof. Dr. Oliver Budzinski, Professor of Economic Theory, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau University 
of Technology, Germany, Email: oliver.budzinski@tu-ilmenau.de. A former version of this paper 
was prepared for the OECD Policy Roundtable “Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation” (Hearing) 
that took place on June 17th, 2014, at the OECD in Paris, France. For further information see 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/enhanced-enforcement-cooperation.htm (accessed 2014-
06-20, 14.49). I thank the other panelists, Michal Gal, Diane P. Wood and John Temple Lang, An-
tonio Capobianco of the OECD as well as all participants for valuable comments and discussion. 
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- increasing burden on taxpayers due to the parallel investigation of virtually 
the same case facts by multiple authorities (with comprehensive references 
Budzinski 2014), 
- divergent outcomes (with comprehensive references Budzinski 2008a: 33-49), 
and 
- power asymmetries between different authorities allowing for beggar-thy-
neighbor strategic policies (for instance, non-prosecution of export cartels into 
small and developing countries with weak authorities) (with comprehensive 
references Budzinski 2008a: 54-64). 
So far, cooperation among antitrust authorities focuses strongly on minimizing the 
risk of divergent outcomes by means of information exchange, mutual notification 
and consultation, mutual assistance and (at times) negative comity. This is in partic-
ular true for bilateral cooperation agreements (Budzinski 2008a: 49-53; Budzinski 
2014: 10-12).1 Furthermore, the currently most important multilateral forum, the In-
ternational Competition Network, does not include considerable case-related ambi-
tion of cooperation but rather concentrates on (softly and voluntarily) harmonizing 
competition policy cultures by defining non-binding best practices (Budzinski 2004a; 
Budzinski 2008a: 142-148; Budzinski 2014: 14-20). In line with the goals of this OECD 
Hearing2 and since I have written about these issues extensively elsewhere, I will not 
go into the questions of deficiencies of uncoordinated national competition policy 
regimes, insufficiencies of hitherto (bilateral and multilateral) cooperation agree-
ments and practices or welfare effects of international competition policy3 in this 
paper. Instead, I will focus on discussing a particular concept aiming to solve the 
remaining problems of multiple proceedings by enhanced cooperation among (com-
petent) competition authorities. The concept concentrates on rationalizing competi-
tion policy enforcement as to economize on transaction costs and taxpayer burden. 
In doing so, this concept clearly extends the boundaries of the antitrust cooperation 
frameworks that are currently in place. Whether there is a political will to establish 
the necessary reforms may be doubtful, at least in the short run. However, this shall 
not stop academic thinking about possible solutions, their institutional shape, work-
ing mechanisms and economic performance.  
The concept that I will discuss in this paper, drawing closely on former research of 
mine (Budzinski 2008a, 2009, 2011), is the idea of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model 
where a lead agency investigates and handles a given case on behalf of the other 
1 There are some few exceptions, though, like for instance the cooperation between the competition 
authorities of Australia and New Zealand that include cross appointments of senior commissioners 
to cases that affect both jurisdictions. Thus, a ‘common’ case is conducted by a team to which a 
commissioner of the other country is associated. See http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/busi-
ness/qoa/49HansQ_20101123_00000007/7-commerce-commissions-new-zealand-and-aus-
tralia%E2%80%94cross-appointments (accessed 2014-06-20, 16.25). 
2 OECD Hearing on Enhanced International Cooperation in Paris, 2014-06-17; see footnote #. 
3 See on these issues with extensive references Budzinski 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008a, 2014. 
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affected jurisdictions – and with their support – and decides a case while recognizing 
the legitimate interests of all affected jurisdictions. This ambitious idea combines the 
concepts of lead jurisdictions and multilevel governance (section 2) and poses a num-
ber of crucial questions as to its institutional design and working properties (section 
3):  
- what is the lead agency and how should it be selected? 
- what competences would be delegated (and by whom) to the lead agency? 
- what are the incentives to ‘getting the cases right’ (vis-à-vis strategic inter-
ests)? 
- what are the (economic) advantages and disadvantages? 
Eventually, I will highlight some limits and open research questions (section 4) before 
I conclude (section 5). So, what is a lead jurisdiction model and how can it be com-
bined with multilevel governance? 
2. Lead Jurisdiction Models as Enhanced Cooperation: Concept and Principles 
The economic literature offers, inter alia, two interesting concepts for enhanced in-
ternational cooperation. The first concept is the idea of a lead jurisdiction model 
(Campbell & Trebilcock 1993, 1997; Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004). It extends the pos-
itive comity concept by allocating competence and responsibility for multijurisdic-
tional competition cases to one of the affected regimes that subsequently handles 
and decides the case with a view to avoiding anticompetitive effects in the overall 
geographic market (i.e. in all affected jurisdictions) and by relying on the assistance 
of the other involved regimes. Two variants of lead jurisdiction can be distinguished: 
the model of a voluntary lead jurisdiction (advanced comity principle) (Campbell & 
Trebilcock 1993, 1997) and the mandatory lead jurisdiction concept (Trebilcock & 
Iacobucci 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 166-168, 203-206).4 
The advanced comity principle, which represents the core element of the voluntary 
lead jurisdiction model, significantly extends the standard comity principles. If an 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice is to be reviewed by more than one compe-
tition policy regime (according to their respective standards), the affected jurisdic-
tions appoint a lead jurisdiction, whose antitrust authority is designated to play the 
role of a coordinating agency (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993: 149-150, 1997: 109-110; 
Rowley, Wakil & Campbell 2000: 27-28). The latter implies that the lead jurisdiction 
does not suspend the reviews of the other involved jurisdictions. Instead, it coordi-
nates their reviews, i.e. it collects and distributes information from the interacting 
agencies and, thereby, ensuring mutual comity (i.e. mutual respect for each other’s 
4 The U.S. antitrust law system uses an interesting institution in cases of multiple antitrust procedures 
among U.S. states, namely the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, established in 1968. It 
entails the option of combining parallel proceedings into a single one, unifying the case (see in 
more detail Ostolaza & Hartmann 2005; Heyburn & McGovern 2012). 
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legitimate interests). Eventually, the coordinating agency compiles a common but 
non-binding recommendation regarding remedies, which integrates the competi-
tion-oriented interests of the participating jurisdictions, in order to generate a coher-
ent treatment of a specific international anticompetitive arrangement or practice. 
Each regime that claims jurisdiction over the case then decides the case on its own 
and it remains to its own deliberation whether and how far it considers the recom-
mendation of the lead jurisdiction. Thus, the voluntary lead jurisdiction model in-
cludes permanent opt-in and opt-out options: any regime may decide at any stage 
whether to enter the cooperation and/or follow the recommendations as well as sim-
ilarly decide to opt-out of the cooperation and proceed with its own stance towards 
the case in question. Consequently, the voluntary lead jurisdiction model may not 
considerably enhance the existing cooperation – in particular, in all the cases where 
the involved jurisdictions are reluctant to share their insights and not willing to adjust 
their own decisions according to the lead recommendations. In other cases, however, 
the level of cooperation may be significantly enhanced if the involved agencies en-
gage in cooperation with the lead jurisdiction and adopt the decision recommenda-
tion as a guideline for their own decision. In summary, it will be case-dependent if 
cooperation is enhanced or not. 
The mandatory lead jurisdiction model extends the concept of cooperation via the 
appointment of a lead jurisdiction by allocating ‘hard’ competences and responsibil-
ity for multijurisdictional competition cases to one of the affected regimes that sub-
sequently handles and decides the case with a view to avoiding anticompetitive ef-
fects in the overall geographic market (i.e. in all affected jurisdictions) and by relying 
on the assistance of the other involved regimes. The mandatory character of this 
model lies in the binding character of the lead jurisdiction’s decision: the decision of 
the lead agency binds the other affected jurisdictions. Thus, opt-in and opt-out op-
tions are reduced to the decision of joining the model or not. Once a jurisdiction has 
committed to the mandatory lead jurisdiction model, it cannot opt-out anymore.5 It 
is this more advanced and more ambitious version of the lead jurisdiction concept 
that I will refer to in this paper. 
The second concept is the idea of multilevel governance (Kerber 2003) in which re-
gimes on different vertical levels (regional, national, supranational) are intercon-
nected with each other. In such a complex multilevel system of institutions, the allo-
cation of competences becomes particularly important (Budzinski 2008a). At the 
same time, different types of competences (for instance, rule-making, rule-applying 
and enforcement competences or substantive and procedural competences) can be 
5 It would be possible to relate this opt-in option to each single case, i.e. that participating competi-
tion policy regimes decide in each single case whether they commit to the lead jurisdiction model 
or not. For reasons of simplicity, however, I will assume in the following that jurisdictions who 
commit to the model do so for all upcoming cases.  
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allocated to different levels, so that a division of labor occurs. The advantage of add-
ing the vertical multilevel dimension to the lead jurisdiction concept lies in the option 
to introduce a referee authority, monitoring and supervising the impartiality of the 
assigned lead jurisdiction and providing conflict resolution if necessary. Thus, in this 
concept, the antitrust institutions on the top level (the supranational or even global 
level) are not about materially deciding cases. Instead, they allocate lead jurisdiction 
according to agreed-upon criteria on a case basis6, monitor and supervise the lead 
jurisdiction in respect of its impartial treatment of anticompetitive effects in the over-
all relevant international market (irrespective where – in which jurisdiction – the ef-
fects display) and settle conflicts in case of affected jurisdictions allege that their 
domestic effects (legitimate interests) were disregarded by the lead jurisdiction. Con-
sequently, ‘only’ procedural competences are assigned to the top level and all mate-
rial and substantive decision competences remain on the level of the existing com-
petition policy regimes that include national, regional-supranational (e.g. the EU) 
and regional-subnational regimes (e.g. State antitrust in the U.S.).  
From an economic perspective, the charm of this concept is that it  
(i) replaces the inbound focus of existing competition policy regimes by a fo-
cus embracing all effects in the relevant geographic (international) market, 
(ii) provides a one-stop shop for the companies (thus avoiding deficient trans-
action and administration costs of multiple procedures),  
(iii) closes many loopholes due to the lead jurisdiction being powerful and also 
providing protection of competition abroad, and  
(iv) maintains diversity of competition regimes7 because each assigned lead ju-
risdiction handles and decides the case according to this regime’s antitrust 
rules and procedures, just with the explicit inclusion of cross-border ef-
fects.  
On the downside, it requires an international agreement on procedural rules (in par-
ticular criteria for allocating case-specific lead jurisdiction as well as for monitoring 
and conflict resolution mechanisms) and willingness to accept  
(i) procedural decisions by the international level and  
(ii) material decisions by the lead jurisdiction as long as all effects are treated 
impartially irrespective of their jurisdictional location.  
6 This only refers to multijurisdictional cases; cases that display effects merely within one of the exist-
ing competition policy regimes are solely subject to this regime’s jurisdiction. See for more details 
about possible notification and referral rules in a multilevel competition policy system Budzinski 
(2009: 379)  
7 On the benefits of regime diversity in competition policy see Kerber & Budzinski (2004); Budzinski 
(2008a: 64-83); Budzinski (2008b). 
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After outlining the basic properties of the concept, the next section explores more 
deeply into its details. 
3. Competence Allocation within a Multilevel Lead-Jurisdiction Model 
3.1 Enhanced Cooperation I: Allocating and Supervising Lead Jurisdiction Compe-
 tence 
The notion of assigning a lead jurisdiction with ‘hard’ competences of handling, in-
vestigating and deciding a given case requires a cooperative forum that manages the 
selection process and safeguards an appropriate case-handling. Such a forum could 
be either (i) an international organization or agency, consisting of an independent 
body, or – more in the spirit of enhanced cooperation -  (ii) an international forum 
or panel consisting of representatives of participating competition policy regimes.8 
For reasons of convenience, I call it the International Competition Panel (ICP) in the 
following.9 The enhanced cooperation in the multilevel lead jurisdiction model re-
quires the implementation of such a forum that is equipped with considerable pro-
cedural competences. However, it does not require substantive antitrust laws at this 
international level of cooperation – and as such the mandatory lead jurisdiction 
model (as ambitious as it is) remains a modest proposal compared to far-reaching 
ideas of global competition laws and agencies.10  
Notwithstanding, it needs to be equipped with considerable procedural compe-
tences, namely competences (i) regarding the selection of competent jurisdictions 
according to the mandatory lead jurisdiction model and (ii) to review, monitor and 
supervise rules and practices of participating competition policy regimes in order to 
safeguard that the regimes are able to apply their laws according to a nondiscrimi-
nation principle also to effects abroad (Budzinski 2008a: 178-182).11 Consequently, 
the ICP neither creates its own substantive competition law, nor does it apply or 
enforce substantive competition law directly. Instead, it is the lead jurisdiction that 
applies its own competition rules to a given anticompetitive arrangement or practice 
8 For different models how to equip such a forum or panel with representatives from the participating 
competition policy regimes (including rotation schemes) see Budzinski (2009: 379-381). 
9 It may be possible to employ the ICN or some of its structures for this purpose. 
10 Examples for the latter include the Doha Declaration of introducing competition rules into the WTO 
framework or the academic proposal of the DIAC (Fikentscher & Immenga 1995; Fox 1997, 1998; 
Zäch 1999; Drexl 2003, 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 134-141). 
11 It is important to emphasize that the ICP cannot prescribe competition policy rules or practices; it 
is only entitled to combat discriminatory rules and practices. This distinction is important from an 
institutional-economics perspective (Hayek 1975; Kerber 1993; Wegner 1997) since (a) a prohibi-
tion excludes only one specific option from the non-determined set of possible options, whereas 
(b) a prescription effectively eliminates any scope of selection and de facto excludes all the other 
options by prescribing one of them. In the first case, the regimes maintain behavioural freedom, 
including the freedom to create innovative solutions; both is effectively eroded in the second case. 
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and enforces the outcome of its proceedings. In contrast, the ICP competences can 
be specified to include the following three elements: 
(i) Selection of Lead Jurisdiction 
If a case occurs that would lead to multiple procedures among the members of 
the system (see more detailed section 3.3), the ICP appoints a lead jurisdiction 
according to a defined set of criteria. As a potential lead jurisdiction for a given 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice qualifies any competition policy regime 
(Budzinski 2011: 85-86) 
(a) whose internal markets represent a regional gravity of the market activities 
(e.g. aggregate turnover of the participating enterprises),  
(b) whose agency enforces a working and nondiscriminatory competition law, 
(c) whose agency disposes over sufficient capacities and competences for the case 
in question, and  
(d) that demonstrates (and has demonstrated) the willingness and experience to 
investigate, handle and decide the case with a view of protecting all affected 
consumers and markets, i.e. to safeguard comity to other jurisdictions’ legitimate 
interests.  
The ICP appoints the competition policy regime to act as the lead jurisdiction that 
best fulfils these four criteria. In many cases, the choice will be rather obvious, if 
not, the ICP enjoys a limited but inevitable discretionary scope. The lead jurisdic-
tion receives full competences to deal with the respective anticompetitive ar-
rangement or practice under the obligation of nondiscrimination and pursuance 
of the common welfare of all affected consumers irrespective of their location. It 
forms a team with all the other jurisdictions whose internal markets are affected 
by the anticompetitive arrangement or practice in question. The non-lead juris-
dictions provide support and assistance to the lead jurisdiction, injecting their 
concerns, views and competences into the investigation and decision-finding pro-
ceedings. 
Criterion (a) reflects the concept of a primary effects clause (Trebilcock & 
Iacobucci 2004). In order to minimize incentives for strategic competition policies 
and discriminatory action by the lead jurisdiction, this criterion focuses on market 
effects, i.e. effects on consumers (Neven & Röller 2005; Haucap et al. 2006). Al-
ternatively, the location of companies and their production facilities could be con-
sidered as well, however, entailing the danger of strategic locational interests 
trumping consumer welfare considerations. 
 
7 
 
(ii) Supervision and Sanctions 
The ICP reviews the competition rules and codified practices of the participating 
competition policy regimes regarding violations of the nondiscrimination princi-
ple. In cases of discriminatory rules or practices, it demands the modification of 
the respective provisions (however, without prescribing alternative designs). If the 
respective competition policy regime refuses to adjust its rules and practices ac-
cordingly, this regime is disqualified and suspended as a potential lead jurisdic-
tion. This procedure also applies to safeguard a minimum necessary nexus with 
an anticompetitive arrangement or practice to claim jurisdiction.12 Additionally, 
the ICP supervises the review and decision process by the lead jurisdiction, but 
exclusively concerning violations of nondiscrimination. Potential sanctions, again, 
refer to the qualification of an acting lead jurisdiction for future cases. 
(iii) Complaints and Conflict Resolution 
The ICP hears and reviews complaints from jurisdictions or enterprises (a) about 
decisions of the lead jurisdiction, which disregard foreign consumers and/or non-
discrimination, and (b) about discriminatory rules or practices of competition pol-
icy regimes (including insufficient nexus). Any complaints by parties to the case 
about wrong assessments by the competent antitrust authority or dissents re-
garding the facts of a case fall under the competency of the courts and appella-
tion bodies within the lead jurisdiction. In this sense, ICP provides a cooperative 
forum to deal with conflicts between jurisdictions. 
While the ICP represents the final instance regarding its supervision and conflict res-
olution tasks, an appellation body regarding its jurisdictional decisions (i.e. appoint-
ment of the appropriate lead jurisdiction) may be helpful. An international court 
could be one suitable solution, a second chamber of the panel another. The latter 
may be preferable in order to keep the selection procedure compact. Otherwise, 
transaction costs and the administrative burden on business would increase, deteri-
orating institutional efficiency. 
3.2 Enhanced Cooperation II: Investigating, Handling and Deciding Cases 
The second level of enhanced international cooperation represents the one where 
the cases are actually decided and, consequently, which disposes of substantive an-
titrust competences. It consists of all participating competition policy regimes, which 
may be (i) joint competition policy regimes of confederations or associations of in-
dependent countries, (ii) national competition policy regimes, or (iii) subnational ‘lo-
cal’ competition policy regimes. These competition policy regimes retain their full 
12 Claiming jurisdiction without a sufficient nexus to the respective arrangement can be interpreted 
as representing an indirect kind of discrimination.  
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rule-making, rule-application, and enforcement competences for cross-border anti-
competitive arrangements and practices if the ICP appoints them to be lead jurisdic-
tion in the respective case. Each regime autonomously shapes its own substantive 
competition rules, enforcement institutions, and agencies (including an individual 
composition of elements of the court system, government and independent admin-
istration system, and private litigation) – but minus discriminatory provisions and 
practices, which are excluded and sanctioned by the ICP. Against the background of 
these non-discriminatory institutions and practices, each regime is obliged to con-
sider competitive effects outside its territory according to the common welfare of all 
affected consumers. Apart from that, the appointed lead jurisdiction is free to handle 
the referred case. Eventually, the lead jurisdiction issues a decision on the case that 
may detail different remedies for different regional effects (in different countries).13 
However, due to the lead jurisdiction treatment, the decision displays overall coher-
ence.  
The lead jurisdiction is expected to team up with the other affected antitrust re-
gimes.14 Insofar, the actual casework of the appointed lead jurisdiction requires en-
hanced international cooperation as well. The appointed lead jurisdiction acts to the 
outside as the one-stop-shopping contact for the norm addressees (companies sus-
pected to infringe competition law, their competitors, customers, affected consum-
ers, etc.). It enjoys the power to investigate and decide the case according to its own 
laws, practices and institutions (but with a view to all effects, domestic and abroad). 
In doing so, the lead agency leads a cooperative team consisting of all agencies 
whose internal markets are affected by the case. The non-lead agencies play an im-
portant role in this part of the multilevel lead jurisdiction model. On the one hand, 
they assist the lead agency by providing support in terms of local investigation force 
and their ‘local knowledge advantages’ (from being close to their markets). Moreo-
ver, they contribute resources and special competences that are needed in the case 
in question and cannot be provided by the lead agency alone. For instance, an in-
volved non-lead agency may possess specific competences regarding sophisticated 
economic methods and may, at request, employ them to provide the lead agency 
with additional evidence. On the other hand, the cooperation within the team of 
affected jurisdictions also offers the opportunity for non-lead jurisdictions to inject 
their views, theories of harm and competition-oriented interests into the proceed-
ings, thus increasing the probability that the outcome will satisfy their demands. It 
can be expected that close cooperation between the lead agency and the other in-
volved agencies during the actual case handling will promote the emergence of a 
13 For instance, in the case of an international hardcore cartel, the lead agency may specify what 
penalties (amounts) have to be paid to which jurisdictions’ authorities, depending on the harm 
that the cartel caused in these jurisdictions. 
14 Again, violations of this cooperation imperative have a negative impact on the probability of future 
lead jurisdiction appointments. 
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common view on the case in question and, thereby, erode the scope for conflicts 
about the decision and remedies to a significant extent. 
When it comes to lead jurisdiction appointments, existing supranational regimes may 
be a natural candidate. The most comprehensive example is represented by the EU 
Competition Policy System, which contains full-fledged competition rules and an ex-
perienced antitrust practice. Additionally, there are antitrust provisions and agencies 
on a supranational level in the context of several other multicountry associations. For 
instance, both the Andean Community and the UEMOA (Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine) have implemented their own competition policy agen-
cies, theoretically competent in enforcing specifically shaped community competition 
rules. Practically, however, both regimes are currently rather inactive. Comparatively 
elaborate competition policy competences are located at the EFTA (European Free 
Trade Association) Surveillance Authority, whereas free trade and economic integra-
tion associations, like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), ASEAN (Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations), Mercosur (Mercado Común del Conor Sur), CIS 
(Community of Independent [former soviet] States), CARICOM (Carribean Commu-
nity and Common Market), FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas), SADC (South 
African Development Community), or CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States), currently only possess at best rudimental antitrust provisions. Meanwhile, 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is also reaching for im-
plementing considerable supranational competition policy competences. 
Following the paragon of the EU, these associations and confederations might de-
velop effective competition policy regimes with considerable competition policy 
competences in the course of time. Developed ones represent natural candidates for 
lead jurisdiction appointments as they jurisdictionally include a number of national 
markets and address consumers of different countries. Therefore, they automatically 
internalise parts of the externalities arising from cross-border business activities. Fur-
thermore, supranational agencies may be less prone to strategic competition policy 
because they are experienced of considering effects on different countries. 
Since currently only one effective supranational antitrust regime exists, the majority 
of cases is likely to remain within the second type of regimes at this level of enhanced 
international cooperation, namely national regimes, in the short- and medium-run. 
In particular, national competition policy regimes with large and important internal 
markets are likely to be frequently appointed as lead jurisdictions. Above all, this 
10 
 
 
 
refers to the U.S. Antitrust System. However, the competition policy regimes of coun-
tries like Canada, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Russia, China, India, and many more also 
represent frequent candidates if they qualify for a lead jurisdiction appointment.15  
Most likely, local (subnational) competition policy regimes will only infrequently qual-
ify as lead jurisdictions for cross-border antitrust cases. Their domains are local anti-
competitive arrangements and practices because, in this respect, they can exploit 
their advantages of being very close to the locally-affected markets. In such cases, 
however, they play an important role within a sound multilevel competition policy 
system. Particularly large countries with considerably segmented internal markets 
may benefit from local competition policy competences. Despite ongoing market 
globalisation, regional and local markets are unlikely to be completely eroded. There-
fore, the scope for regional and local (including subnational) competition policy re-
gimes is a sustainable one. 
3.3 Which Cases Qualify for Being Handled by the Multilevel Lead Jurisdiction Model? 
From the outset of the motivating factors for considering a far-reaching cooperation 
like a multilevel mandatory lead jurisdiction model on it is clear that its competence 
should be limited to those cases where the multijurisdictional treatment causes costs, 
burden and harm. In other words, only truly multijurisdictional cases should qualify 
for being subject to the system. While the notion of truly multijurisdictional may 
sound simple and straightforward at first sight, the devil may hide in the details.  
A basic approach may start with the existing notification rules and picking criteria of 
the participating national and supranational regimes and simply state an X-plus rule 
(Budzinski 2008a: 196-199) for the adoption of a case into the lead jurisdiction sys-
tem. The idea is that anticompetitive arrangements and practices with cross-border 
effects should be allocated ‘upwards’ (to treatment in the lead jurisdiction model), 
whereas other cases should remain within the national competence. As a very simple 
proxy for market affection serves the number of jurisdictions, in which a specific ar-
rangement or practice would be subject to review. If this number exceeds a defined 
value of X (for instance, X = 3 or X = 5), it can be assumed that it generates with a 
sufficient probability significant cross-border spillovers, which justify its inclusion 
into the lead jurisdiction model. An advantage of using such a simplistic criterion is 
its simple application that does not create much cost and is rather transparent. As 
always, this advantage comes along with a disadvantage, notably the different sizes 
15 Next to inhabiting the regional gravity of the aggregate turnover of the participating enterprises, a 
qualification to become appointed lead jurisdiction requires the absence of discriminatory provi-
sions and practices as well as the proven willingness and experience to employ a world welfare 
standard (see above). This implies that some of the above mentioned countries might face a long 
way to go until they meet these criteria. Note, however, that the possibility to qualify as lead 
jurisdiction can entail important incentives to develop national competition policy regimes accord-
ing to the modern international standards. 
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of the national regimes: if X = 3 this may refer to three comparatively small countries 
(say, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) or to three comparatively big countries (say, the 
U.S., Mexico, and Brazil). Obviously, it makes a difference for the ‘truly multijurisdic-
tional character’ whether the first or the second scenario applies. Thus, the X could 
be complemented by a factor representing the size of a regime’s internal market (or 
population), an addition that would somewhat increase the complexity of delineat-
ing the lead jurisdiction cases from the others but may still remain sufficiently simple 
and transparent enough. Unfortunately, there is no scientific way of determining X 
or the correcting factor, so that would be up for a political consensus.16 
In order to avoid strategic behaviour, a multilevel lead jurisdiction model requires 
rules about notification and picking thresholds on the level of the existing regimes. 
The participating competition policy regimes need adequate notification thresholds 
for mergers and interfirm cooperative arrangements and respective rules for picking 
up cartels and other anticompetitive arrangements or practices in order to avoid that 
jurisdiction is claimed even if no sufficient nexus with the (anti-) competitive effects 
of a business arrangement or practice exists. In this field, the already existing ICN 
best practice recommendations on sufficient nexus for claiming jurisdiction may 
serve as a focal point. Furthermore, the specifics of the different types of competition 
cases – cartels, mergers and acquisitions, abuse-of-dominance cases – require differ-
ent treatments in this regard.17  
4. Limits and Problems of Lead Jurisdiction Concepts 
Even though the concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model entails the potential 
to solve the remaining problems of international competition policy through an en-
hanced, deeper and more systematic cooperation among the existing competition 
policy regimes (and without creating new international substantive competition law), 
it contains a number of inherent problems – like every concept does. In the following, 
selected problems are discussed with a view to their severity and to possibilities of 
alleviating them. 
4.1 The Incentive Problem 
Probably the most crucial problem relates to the incentive of an appointed lead ju-
risdiction to conduct the given case without privileging its own jurisdiction’s interests 
and without discriminating against the interests of the other affected jurisdictions. 
For the system to work, the lead jurisdiction must decide the case with consumer 
welfare in all affected markets in mind and, thus, pursuing international welfare in-
16 For alternative case allocation rules (that, however, tend to perform worse) see Budzinski (2008a: 
168-199). 
17 Gal (2010) presents an interesting example of a solution for horizontal hardcore cartels that may 
prove to be very compatible with the ideas outlined in this paper. 
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stead of national welfare. In economic language, it can be said that the lead jurisdic-
tion is expected to provide a positive externality, i.e. producing a benefit for the other 
affected jurisdictions without gaining a direct benefit for itself (in addition to its 
benefits if it would pursue the case with only national welfare in mind). In many 
cases this may be rather unproblematic though since competition cases often display 
similar or comparable effects in different jurisdictions. For instance, a hardcore cartel 
will reduce welfare in all the national markets it sells its products and, similarly, a 
merger to monopoly will be detrimental to welfare everywhere. Consequently, in 
such cases, the lead jurisdiction does not run into a serious conflict and mainly needs 
to consider the rectified foreign effects when deciding the extent of sanctions and 
remedies. The perspective of reciprocity among the involved jurisdictions may suffice 
to motivate a fair treatment of all effects by the lead jurisdiction in such cases. 
Obviously, the crucial cases are the ones where the interests of the lead jurisdiction 
stand in (partial) conflict to those of (some of) the other affected jurisdictions. Or, in 
other words, the cases in which a treatment according to national welfare only would 
lead to a different assessment than a treatment considering the effects abroad. A 
reason for such a deviation of interests and/or regional effects may be that producers 
and consumers are unevenly distributed across the involved jurisdictions (Barros & 
Cabral 1994; Head & Ries 1997). Consider for instance a case where the lead juris-
diction predominantly domiciles the (e.g. cartelizing or merging) producers, whereas 
the consumers are predominantly located in the other jurisdictions.18 Then, a na-
tional welfare treatment by the lead jurisdiction may imply that (the many) efficiency 
gains outweigh (the few) consumer disadvantages, whereas an investigation across 
all the affected markets would reveal the opposite result (because the weight of the 
producer-side advantages decreases vis-à-vis the demand-side disadvantages). In 
such cases, the lead jurisdiction could be tempted to privilege its own interests over 
the legitimate interests of the other affected jurisdictions. However, while the theo-
retical treatment of this problem in industrial economics shows that cases like this 
are possible, model theory also demonstrates that cases like this can only surface 
under rather heroic assumptions. Consequently, they may actually occur, albeit ra-
ther infrequently because they are rather special – and by far do not represent the 
typical case of conflicting interests. The following type of cases represents a much 
more likely scenario: a purely competition-oriented analysis would yield the same 
result for national and international welfare (i.e. consumer harm prevails). However, 
there is strong lobbyism for the domestic producers, be it by industry lobbyism or by 
political influence (promoting national champions, improving national competitive-
ness, etc.). Competition policy decisions biased by economic patriotism most typically 
do not enhance national welfare and this type of competitiveness-promoting policies 
usually serves to boost the welfare of powerful/influential/well-organized groups 
18 It is questionable, though, whether such a lead jurisdiction selection actually meets the selection 
criteria outlined n section 3.1. 
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within the national economy at the expense of domestic consumers, domestic com-
petitors (in particular less influential small-and-medium-sized companies), and for-
eign jurisdictions (Budzinski 2008a: 53-64). Still, the competition agency of an ap-
pointed lead jurisdiction may face considerable pressure to bias its decision accord-
ingly when the stakes are sufficiently high.19 
However, there are a couple of disciplining factors that may reduce the risk of dis-
criminatory treatment. First, the assigned responsibility for all the effects of a com-
petition case may actually strengthen the position of the appointed agency vis-à-vis 
domestic influence groups and thus increase its ability to withstand pressure from 
vested interests. Under the conditions of the sketched multilevel lead jurisdiction 
model, the responsible lead agency itself experiences strong incentives to act as it is 
expected to be. The ICN-experience shows how effective peer pressure can be in 
terms of disciplining competition authorities and in terms of strengthening their po-
sition within the national policy systems (theoretical treatment: Budzinski 2004a; em-
pirical evidence: Rowley & Campbell 2005; Evenett & Hijzen 2006). These rather ‘soft’ 
disciplining mechanisms should not be underestimated. Moreover, any appointed 
lead jurisdiction needs to consider that a discriminatory case handling inherently 
backfires: the probability of being selected as a lead jurisdiction in the future de-
pends, inter alia, on the jurisdiction’s behavioural history (see selection criteria in 
section 3.1). Thus, a rational lead jurisdiction has to weigh the benefits of a strategic 
decision of the given case against the disadvantages of losing lead jurisdiction ap-
pointments in future cases (plus reputation losses, all corrected by discount rates). 
While there may be cases that may appear to be worth it from the viewpoint of the 
lead jurisdiction, in most cases the balancing exercise should point towards a non-
discriminatory handling and decision (Budzinski 2011: 91). The latter is further sup-
ported by the danger that more independent revision instances (e.g. law courts) may 
scrap the discriminating decision anyway – the probability of which may vary consid-
erably across jurisdictions, though. 
4.2 Divergent Laws Problem 
Another problem originates from divergent competition laws and policies in different 
jurisdictions. Even with lead jurisdictions that handle cases according to nondiscrim-
inatory treatment and international welfare focus, case decisions may differ depend-
ing on the chosen lead jurisdiction due to differences in law and practices. Next to 
substantive differences in law, like for instance the transatlantic divide on sanctions 
against cartels (monetary fines against companies only in Europe versus a combina-
tion of company fines and criminal prosecution of acting managers in North-Amer-
ica), divergent case decisions may be caused by differences in the applied theories – 
19 The transatlantic antitrust ‚wars‘ over the Boeing-MDD-merger (Fox 1998b) and the eventually 
aborted GE-Honeywell-proposal (Gerber 2003) offer prime examples. 
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both theories of harm and underlying economic theories. For instance, different out-
comes of merger control assessments of the same case in the EU and the U.S. are 
not so much rooted in the (minor) differences of how the prohibition criterion is 
phrased (significant lessening of competition vs. significant impediment of effective 
competition). Instead, they are caused by referring to different economic theories 
and differences in the – always uncertain – assessment of probabilities of future ef-
fects and counterfactual effects. The same can be claimed for differences in the treat-
ment of vertical effects. However, notwithstanding these competition-policy-inher-
ent divergences, empirically the most relevant divergences in the past originated 
from strategic policies and the inbound focus (disregarding effects that affect mar-
kets abroad) – like in virtually all of the famous transatlantic conflict cases (Boeing-
MDD, GE-Honeywell, Amadeus, etc.20). Since this reason for divergent outcomes 
should disappear if all effects are considered in a nondiscriminatory way, the remain-
ing scope for divergent case decisions (depending on the assigned lead jurisdiction) 
may actually not be that significant anymore. This is further reinforced by the success 
story of the best practice convergence in the course of the ICN work that has reduced 
differences in competition policy practices to a considerable extent (Rowley & Camp-
bell 2005; Evenett & Hijzen 2006).  
Still, running a (mandatory) lead jurisdiction concept requires the acceptance of 
some scope for divergent ‘outcomes’ – referring to divergences between the actual 
lead jurisdiction decision and counterfactual decisions by other affected jurisdictions 
if they had run their own proceedings21 – that remains despite the safeguarding and 
alleviating factors. The participating jurisdictions need to live with a limited degree 
of inconsistency in terms of equal treatment of equal cases with different lead juris-
dictions.22 Notwithstanding, the cooperation among the lead jurisdiction and the 
other involved jurisdiction on the second level of enhanced cooperation (section 3.2) 
will contribute to improving acceptance of lead decisions. In addition, on a more 
psychological or behavioural (economics) note, once a lead jurisdiction system is run-
ning, there are no actual divergent outcomes anymore, which is one of the ad-
vantages of such a model. Instead, it is just hypothetical (counterfactual) divergent 
outcomes – what would have been decided if another jurisdiction had been ap-
pointed as lead jurisdiction. 
From another angle, the remaining scope for applying different theories of harm and 
different underlying economic theories may actually viewed to be an advantage of 
20 See with further references Budzinski (2008a: 32-64). 
21 Note that within the system there cannot be divergent outcomes of a given case anymore due to 
the one-stop-shop at the lead jurisdiction. The fact that all divergences will be only hypothetical – 
in the sense of as-if outcomes in the counterfactual that another agency would have run the case 
– may actually (psychologically, behaviorally) contribute to a better acceptance of lead agency 
decisions because divergences are not immediately visible anymore. 
22 However, competition cases are never really equal, further reducing the perceptibility of this prob-
lem – once the system is up and running. 
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the multilevel lead jurisdiction model. Sustaining a limited diversity of regimes, the-
ories and practices allows for beneficial institutional learning (Kerber & Budzinski 
2004). The economics of competition and antitrust are a dynamic field of science 
that does not rest upon one everlasting and true unifying theory. Instead, the dy-
namics of theory innovation and development are intense, both due to inner-science 
factors and due to the dynamics of the object of analysis (Budzinski 2008b). Limited 
diversity of policies, then, offers scope for injecting new knowledge into competition 
policy practice, testing new theories (parallel experimentation) and thus speeding up 
the knowledge accumulation process. As such, it may actually be beneficial to live 
with a limited extent of divergent laws, practices and policies as well as (counterfac-
tual) divergent outcomes. 
4.3 Lack-of-Eligible-Lead-Jurisdiction Problem  
Eventually, I address a problem that may frustrate the workability of the lead juris-
diction system if it is empirically relevant. There may be a danger that too few re-
gimes fulfil the criteria of becoming a lead jurisdiction so that the same handful of 
big agencies will lead all the cases. In other words, the market for lead jurisdiction 
may not be competitive but instead dominated by a narrow oligopoly of regimes – 
or even a dominant U.S.-EU-duopoly. The reason is that in particular small regimes 
may struggle to be selected as lead jurisdiction: firstly, they are less likely to accumu-
late significant shares of the relevant market activities within their domestic markets 
and, secondly, they may lack capacity and (sophisticated) competence to deal with 
major multijurisdictional cases. As such, the criteria for lead jurisdiction appoint-
ments laid out in section 3.1 entail a tendency to favour experienced and well-
equipped agencies as well as such with a large domestic market. This may represent 
a problem for three reasons: 
- if many jurisdictions virtually have no chance of becoming a lead jurisdiction, 
this may undermine their acceptance of the overall system and of lead deci-
sions due to a lack of (felt) own influence. 
- if the ICP faces a narrow and powerful oligopoly of agencies that qualify for 
lead jurisdiction tasks, it may become difficult to enforce the fundamental 
principles of nondiscriminatory treatment and international welfare orienta-
tion due to a lack of alternatives in case that these agencies do not comply. 
- if jurisdictions become disconnected to international cases due to their inabil-
ity to qualify as lead jurisdictions, then this may also negatively influence their 
capabilities to deal with domestic cases.  
However, some alleviating factors may imply that this problem is not so severe em-
pirically. First, there will be many cases that are sufficiently multijurisdictional to war-
rant their inclusion in the multilevel lead jurisdiction model but that are sufficiently 
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regional in terms of their impact to qualify other than the big regimes to serve as 
lead jurisdiction. Note that the phenomenon we usually label as globalisation in-
cludes considerable trends of (interjurisdictional) regionalization as well. Second, en-
hanced international cooperation while ‘doing’ the case (see section 3.2) may allevi-
ate to some degree a lack of agency size and experience since other affected juris-
dictions may assist the lead jurisdiction, also with capacities and specialised compe-
tences (like economic expertise). Third, (again) enhanced international cooperation II 
helps non-lead agencies to remain connected with the international environment 
and with the development, experience and progress that is associated with it. 
Eventually, the real problem may actually stand in sharp contrast to this discussion: 
(some) regimes with small but open national economies may experience incentives 
to free ride on the lead jurisdiction system and downgrade their own competition 
policy regime. Instead of aiming to qualify for lead jurisdiction duties (which always 
involves to some extent the necessity to provide a positive externality), these regimes 
may opt for saving resources and rely on the decisions of lead jurisdictions regarding 
the desired level of protection of competition. Notwithstanding, there may not be so 
many jurisdictions in reality that find it attractive to revert to this free-riding position. 
As soon as a jurisdiction experiences a non-negligible number of purely domestic 
antitrust cases (where it cannot rely on foreign agencies to protect competition and 
welfare), it is not rational to limit domestic competition policy activities to a free rider 
position. 
5. Conclusion 
This contribution discusses a possible avenue towards rationalizing multiple compe-
tition policy procedures by an enhanced international cooperation. The concept of a 
multilevel lead jurisdiction model represents an interesting step to combine the con-
cepts of lead jurisdictions and multilevel governance. The advantage of adding the 
vertical multilevel dimension to the lead jurisdiction concept lies in the option to 
introduce a referee authority, monitoring and supervising the impartiality of the as-
signed lead jurisdictions and providing conflict resolution if necessary. Thus, cooper-
ation among competition agencies on the global level (enhanced cooperation I) is 
not about materially deciding cases. Instead, it allocates lead jurisdiction according 
to agreed-upon criteria on a case basis, monitor and supervise the lead jurisdiction 
in respect of its impartial treatment of anticompetitive effects in the overall relevant 
international market (irrespective where – in which jurisdiction – the effects display) 
and settle conflicts in case of affected jurisdictions allege that their domestic effects 
were disregarded by the lead jurisdiction.  
Consequently, all material and substantive decision competences remain on the level 
of the existing national and regional-supranational regimes. Here, each competition 
case is dealt with by a team of affected jurisdictions. While the lead jurisdiction acts 
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to the outside as the one-stop-shopping contact for the companies (and other in-
volved parties) and enjoys the power to investigate and decide the case according to 
its own laws, practices and institutions (but with a view to all effects, domestic and 
abroad), the actual case handling internally consists of interagency cooperation as 
well (enhanced cooperation II). The lead agency leads a cooperative team consisting 
of all agencies whose internal markets are affected by the case. The non-lead agen-
cies inject their views and (competition-) interests into the case and provide assisting 
force, resources and competences. 
From an economic perspective, the charm of this concept is that it (i) replaces the 
inbound focus of existing competition policy regimes by a focus embracing all effects 
in the relevant geographic (international) market, (ii) provides a one-stop shop for 
the norm addressees (thus avoiding deficient transaction and administration costs of 
multiple procedures), (iii) closes many loopholes due to the lead jurisdiction being 
powerful and also providing protection of competition abroad, and (iv) maintains 
diversity of competition regimes because each assigned lead jurisdiction handles and 
decides the case according to this regime’s antitrust rules and procedures, just with 
the explicit inclusion of cross-border effects. On the downside, it requires an interna-
tional agreement on procedural rules (in particular criteria for allocating case-specific 
lead jurisdiction as well as for monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms) and 
willingness to accept (i) procedural decisions by the international level and (ii) mate-
rial decisions by the lead jurisdiction as long as all effects are treated impartially irre-
spective of their jurisdictional location. This certainly represents a higher hurdle for 
consensus than the ICN-style network cooperation, but certainly a lower hurdle than 
consensus on binding global competition rules within the WTO framework. And from 
an economic perspective, such a multilevel lead jurisdiction model appears to be wel-
fare-superior to these alternatives. Furthermore, there are many ways of taking steps 
into the direction of a serious lead jurisdiction model but with extensive (case-re-
lated) opt-in and opt-out options in order to reduce the commitment hurdle.  
At the end of the day, the concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model is far from 
being comprehensively researched and completely developed. Still, it does represent 
one of the more interesting avenues for thinking about enhanced cooperation.  
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